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Youth Mobility Scheme: The Panacea for Ending Free Movement? 
Abstract 
Free movement has been at the heart of the Brexit debate, with the government grappling between 
satisfying public and business demands for restrictive and liberal approaches to immigration 
respectively. In response the government have advocated temporary migration as a potential solution, 
including an expanded UK-EU Youth Mobility Scheme modelled on the current T5 YMS on the 
assumption that YMS migrants undertake low skilled jobs. Little is known about this visa or the 
labour market activity of YMS migrants. Drawing on policy analysis alongside survey and interview 
data from Australian YMS migrants, this paper seeks to bridge some of these knowledge gaps, 
arguing that an expanded EU YMS will not attract significant EU migrants, and is far from a remedy 
for free movement ending.  
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Introduction  
The UK labour market has come to be structurally reliant on EU labour to fill shortages in low and 
mid skilled sectors for over a decade. With 500,000 EU migrants employed in low skilled/low wage 
industries in 2017i, the prospect of ending free movement raises major questions as to how these 
shortages will be filled. Expanding temporary migration programmes, such as the UK’s Tier 5 Youth 
Mobility Scheme (YMS), whilst no panacea appears to be an attractive solution for policymakers to 
this dilemma. Whilst details on the UK’s future immigration system remain ambiguous, the 
government has proposed an expanded EU-UK wide Youth Mobility Scheme, modeled on the UK’s 
current Tier 5 Youth Mobility Schemeii, which allows young migrants from selected countries to live 
and work in the UK for up to two years. The government has proposed such a scheme because ‘it is 
believed most people who come to the UK under a YMS engage in lower skilled work’ and therefore 
the new scheme will ‘provide an additional source of labour for the UK labour market’iii.  
The UK’s Youth Mobility Scheme (previously working holidaymakers scheme) has long been a 
passage for young migrants to combine tourism whilst working in the UK. This is a middling form of 
migration that sits on the nexus between tourism and work migration, which has long represented a 
rite of passage for young people. Tier 5 migrants including YMS migrants remain politically hidden 
by their association with tourism, and with no employer sponsor requirements for the YMS the labour 
market activity of this group is largely unknown. With an expanded EU wide YMS being the only 
current concrete policy proposal, an examination of whether the assumptions surrounding this 
mobility are accurate is warranted. This paper examines the YMS, including the policy evolution and 
labour market activity of current YMS migrants to explore whether a EU wide YMS is feasible or 
even desirable. Drawing on a study of Australian YMS migrants in London, I argue that the YMS is 
no panacea for free movement ending and is unlikely to attract significant EU migrants to the UK. If 
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this scheme is to be successful in attracting significant numbers of young EU migrants, various rights 
under the YMS should be expanded.  
Methodologically the article is based on three sources. Firstly, policy analysis of relevant government 
documents combined with unique immigration policy index (ImPol) to visualise changes in the YMS 
over time. Secondly, 75 surveys with Tier 5 Youth Mobility Australian migrants living in London. 
Thirdly, 20 in depth interviews YMS Australians conducted between April 2015 and May 2016.  The 
paper is divided into five sections. Firstly, the UK labour market and consequential dilemma of free 
movement ending is presented. Secondly, the policy evolution of the YMS is discussed as well as the 
factors behind the promotion of temporary migration governance in the UK. Thirdly, the paper draws 
on key results from surveys and interviews with Australians on the UK YMS to examine what the 
speculative evidence shows of their labour market activity and the motivations to migrate on a YMS 
visa. The conclusion reflects on whether a EU wide YMS is feasible or desirable based on what we 
know of current YMS migrants.   
Liberal labour market  
The plans to end free movement, and with it a loss of EU labour, has panicked many UK employers 
and not without reason. The Confederation of British Industry estimates that EU workers make up to 
30 per cent of the total workforce in different sectors, that the contribution of EU workers ‘will be 
needed in the future’ and that the ‘current non-EU immigration system is not a solution for EU 
nationals’iv. The loss of EU labour may transcend workforce planning creating spillover effects such 
as rising food pricesv, with the Environmental, Food and Rural Affairs Committee concluding that 
farming and horticulture businesses ‘have big problems retaining labour’ and that ‘the challenge will 
become a crisis if the government do not swiftly take measures’vi. Social work and residential care 
likewise face a ‘perfect storm’ of high employee churn, skills shortages, low pay, and increasing 
labour demand’, with up to 87 per cent of EU employees in social care unable to meet the 
government’s current stringent visa requirementsvii.  
The UK’s reliance on EU labour stems from its mode of capitalism, typically regarded as a liberal 
market economyviii entailing low employment protection, light regulations and a large low-wage 
sectorix. There is consequently a lack of coordinated wage bargaining arrangements, and firms 
primarily coordinate their activities via competition market arrangements. As a result, there are 
incentives for employers to delay costly technological advancements in favour of depending on low-
wage labourx. Declining apprenticeship and training schemes in Britain have further fostered the 
reliance on importing labour. Coupled with decades of deregulation this has lowered incentives for 
employers to invest in skills and training for the domestic labour force. As a result, many sectors such 
as social care, retail and hospitality and construction have come to rely on EU labour to fill labour 
shortages in key sectors in lieu of a native workforce willing to take up low quality jobs.   
Piorexi famously argued that labour markets are divided into primary and secondary sectors otherwise 
known as the dual labour market hypothesis. The primary sector offers stable well-paid employment 
to skilled workers, whilst the secondary is comprised of low-paid, low-skilled jobs – the so-called 3D 
jobs – where migrants are concentrated. Piore argued that the variability in economies (high/low of 
production) create a need for flexible workers who can be dismissed in periods of reduced activity. 
With limited social status and entitlements to belong, migrants concentrate in the secondary sector as 
national workers who aspire for ‘long-term career prospects to define their social position, shun such 
work’xii. Key to this dualism is temporal flexibility − not exclusive to migrants but more generally 
precarious workers − where employers can transfer business risks on to workers through atypical, 
insecure and precarious contracts.  
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Specific sectors have come to rely on EU migrants willing to take on precarious or low quality 
employment including agriculture (99 per cent seasonal workxiii), construction (10 per centxiv), social 
care (8 per centxv/Skills for Care 2018) and retail which employs 15 per cent of the entire UK 
workforce (six per cent)xvi . These low quality jobs are deemed as undesirable by the native workforce 
with little to no job security, poor pay, limited progression opportunities and often dirty, demeaning 
and dangerous/difficult otherwise known as 3D jobs in the secondary market. The current points 
based immigration system offers no legal avenues for non-EU low or mid skilled migrant workers. In 
lieu of opening Tier 3 (low skilled) for the first time since the inception of the PBS in 2008, or the re-
establishment of sector specific scheme, which the government have stated they will not do, ending 
free movement raises major questions as to who will fill these jobs and potentially the future of these 
sectors.  
At the time of writing, aside from free movement ending, the future of immigration system post 
Brexit is unclear. However, the government published a long awaited White Paper on Immigration in 
December 2018xvii, which set out a handful of proposals. Its vision is for a migration system where 
despite a hostile environment the country attracts highly skilled people, while the labour market relies 
on a churn of temporary workers with limited rights. Broadly, the government advocate temporary 
migration as the panacea to future labour shortages, with one of the only concrete policies being to 
expand the current Tier 5 Youth Mobility Scheme to a EU-wide youth mobility scheme presumably as 
some sort of remedy for anticipated labour shortages. Why are the government advocating temporary 
migration? What is the Youth Mobility Scheme and who transits on these visas? Most fundamentally, 
will a EU wide YMS fill residual labour market demands from ending free movement and is a EU 
wide YMS even desirable?  
Immigration policy: Temporary migration 
Key to the UK labour market being reliant on EU labour is that free movement requires no 
certification and in turn no bureaucracy. This has meant that the UK has enjoyed a pool of flexible EU 
workers willing to take jobs which the native workforce deem undesirable, and in turn government 
has had the luxury of foregoing establishing any politically contentious low skilled visas. This is in 
contrast to the principal work entry channel - Tier 2 – for skilled workers where workers must meet 
stringent eligibility criterion including salary thresholds of £30,000 and employers must undertake 
lengthy, bureaucratic and expensive sponsorship requirements. For employers seeking highly skilled 
workers with long-term contracts, such an endeavour is worth the pain. However, low or mid skilled 
sectors where vacancies cannot fulfil the proposed stringent Tier 2 requirements and job forecasting is 
more short term have different needs, above all flexible workers willing to undertake low quality, time 
limited jobs.  
Yet whilst the labour market demands a stock of flexible migrant labour, the public has expressed a 
preference for migration to be reduced. Temporary migration is seen as the in-between solution 
satisfying both the ‘no borders’ and ‘no migrants’ argumentsxviii. The popularity of TMPs amongst 
policymakers stems from the so-called ‘triple-win’ outcomes: the host country can meet labour market 
demands whilst appeasing electoral concerns over permanent settlement; the sending country benefits 
from both remittances and skills transfer/brain gain from migrants acquiring skills in the destination 
state and transferring these skills on return; and the migrants themselves benefit by a mechanism 
which provides people from low-income countries with better access to labour markets in high-
income states. In a context of rising public anxieties over immigration, temporary migration is seen as 
a potential palatable solution that permits greater labour market flexibility whilst being more 
acceptable to electorates that, purportedly, find permanent immigration threateningxix. As a result, the 
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UK government has been endorsing temporary migration since the introduction of the net migration 
target in 2010. 
Whilst policymakers advocate for temporary migration, TMPs have rightly been critiqued for being 
potentially exploitative. This is particularly as visas are usually conditional on employer sponsorship 
often creating bonded labour. Countless accounts detail the exploitation and vulnerability temporary 
migrant workers from the Global South and Central and Eastern Europe face in Britain (and 
elsewhere) in low-skilled jobs, caused by precarity of status and often steered by xenophobia or 
discriminatory practicesxx. Australia’s equivalent YMS – working holidaymakers scheme – sets a 
precedent for the dangers of exploitation of young temporary migrants, including ‘gross 
underpayment of wages, excessive hours of work, sexual and other forms of harassment and sub-
standard living conditions’xxi. Such exploitation has been aggravated by new policy terms that nudge 
WHMs into specific regional low skilled sectors in return for an entitlement to work for a second year 
in Australiaxxii. More generally, policies that discourage long-term settlement provide few incentives 
to integrate, leading to poor community cohesion.  
Despite the dangers of rights violations under badly regulated TMPs, the Coalition government (2010-
2015) and the Conservative administrations (2015-2019) have favoured a migration system 
underpinned by temporariness in pursuant with the net migration target aimed to reduce immigration 
to ‘sustainable levels’ introduced by the Conservative led government in 2010. Crucially third country 
nationals who are present for less than 12 months do not count in the net migration figures. A major 
component of the Conservative governments’ policy has been to ensure that economic immigration is 
an exclusively temporary phenomenon, or to ‘break the link’ between permanent and temporary 
migration as epitomised by Prime Minister May when Home Secretary in 2010: 
It is too easy, at the moment, to move from temporary residence to permanent 
settlement…Working in Britain for a short period should not give someone the right to settle 
in Britain…Settling in Britain should be a cherished right, not an automatic add on to a 
temporary way in’xxiii .  
This appears to be a ‘point of principle for the Conservatives’
xxvii
xxiv, with former Prime Minister 
Cameron stating in April 2011 ‘It cannot be right that people coming to fill short-term skills gaps can 
stay long term’xxv. According to the former UK Border Agency the curtailing of settlement rights 
would ‘discourage over-reliance on foreign workers’xxvi, yet past experience suggests otherwise. As 
Cavanagh puts it ‘the more likely result is a shift to a constantly churning population of temporary 
working migrants – because although the need is permanent, the government is choosing for that need 
to be satisfied by people who stay only temporarily’ .  
Whilst at the time of writing the future immigration system post Brexit is unclear, the government 
published two White Papers in 2018 that signalled the direction of future policy. The new system: 
…will have the same core objectives as now…it must create strong borders, protect the 
vulnerable, enforce the rules and control the numbers and type of people coming to live and 
work here, in line with the continued commitment to reduce annual net migration to 
sustainable levels…from an economic perspective, it must support an open, global economy 
[…] which aims for a highly skilled, innovative and highly productive workforce’xxviii  
The government’s intention to institutionalise temporariness as the norm for all immigration comes in 
the form of a proposal for a strictly time limited 12 month low skilled visa for ‘low risk countries’ 
with no route to permanency or right to bring family. This is proposed as a strictly transitory measure 
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that will be regularly reviewed and possibly closed. However, the key consistent proposal in both 
White Papers is the establishment of an EU wide Youth Mobility Scheme. The government have 
proposed an EU-EU YMS as part of their Mobility Framework ‘to ensure that young people can 
continue to enjoy the social, cultural and educational benefits of living in the EU and the UK’xxix . The 
government intend to design the scheme in broadly the same way as the existing YMS ‘taking account 
of EU specificities’ with the government claiming that ‘it will provide an additional source of labour 
for the UK labour market’xxx. This warrants an examination of the current YMS and how this visa has 
evolved from tourist mobility to labour migration.  
Policy Evolution: Working holidaymakers and Youth Mobility  
The UK Youth Mobility Scheme (YMS), formerly known as the working holidaymakers scheme 
(WHM) is historically one of the longest running youth schemes globally. Concordant with post-war 
concerns to preserve ties with the Commonwealth – ironically due to Britain’s new dominant 
geopolitical alliance with the European Economic Communityxxxi − the Commonwealth project was at 
the heart of the original Working Holiday Makers scheme. It was designed principally as a cultural 
exchange programme for young Commonwealth citizens and thus purely intended for tourism and 
cultural exchange. However, the scheme has been transformed over the years from the perspective of 
policymakers from Commonwealth tourist mobility and cultural exchange to a labour market route.  
Throughout the history of the scheme applicants must always retain entry clearance before being 
admitted including biometric residence permit. Moreover, both the previous WHM and the current 
YMS work on a reciprocal quota basis with each participating country being allocated a number of 
visas based on reciprocal agreements. There were 41,652 YMS visa granted in the year to September 
2017, down one per cent on the previous yearxxxii.   
Whilst the broad design of the scheme has remained consistent − allowing participants to stay in the 
UK for up to two years, with permission to work and little post entry controls − the eligibility criterion 
and rights attached to this visa have changed over the years, as can be seen from the graph below. The 
graph is derived from the Immigration Policy Index (ImPol), which measures policy restrictiveness 
across time and different visas on a basic ordinal scale. The coding is derived from original legal 
sources in this case the immigration rulesxxxiii.   
GRAPH ONE ABOUT HERE: ELIGIBILITY VERSUS RIGHTS YSM  
In the early 1990s, surprisingly WHM could bring dependents aged less than five years old and there 
was no specification that the applicant be unmarried, hence why rights for WHM were higher in this 
period. Moreover, given that all Commonwealth citizens could apply for a WHM, the list of eligible 
nationalities was higher, hence why policy was more liberal on the eligibility criterion dimension. For 
the duration of the 1990s, the eligibility criterion and rights attached to the visa remained consistent. 
The 2000s New Labour governments significantly liberalised the WHM by allowing participants to 
transit to other visas in country and increasing the age eligibility from 18-27 to 18-30, whilst also 
liberalising the type of work that could be undertaken. In 2002 the Labour government changed the 
criterion and effectively transformed this scheme into an economic route, allowing participants to 
switch to the work-permit scheme after 12 months. The type of work was also liberalised so that 
Working Holidaymakers could undertake professional, as well as highly-skilled work for the first 
time. The graph above demonstrates these liberalising policy reforms on the rights dimension in the 
2000s. The liberalising changes made to the Working Holiday Makers Scheme, which took effect 
from August 2003, were in part to ‘make the existing scheme as inclusive as possible of the 
Commonwealth as a whole’, but the changes were principally made to ‘provide a pool of flexible 
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labour that can help alleviate recruitment difficulties faced by UK employers [and] help reduce the 
demand for labour currently supplied by illegal workers’xxxiv. However, following 2004 A8 accession 
and the unexpected wave of immigration this generated, the government began to ‘row back’ on the 
previous attempts to expand labour migrationxxxv, and in 2005 the scheme was restricted, with the old 
criterion being reinstated.  
Following the introduction of the points-based system (PBS), in 2008 the Working Holidaymakers 
Scheme was consolidated with other temporary routes (such as Au Pair visa) and was renamed the 
Youth Mobility Scheme (YMS), subsided under Tier 5 of the PBS which is specifically for temporary 
migration. The age criterion was raised again from 28 to 30 and a maintenance requirement was 
attached to this visa for the first. Yet the most significant change has been the addition of non-
Commonwealth nationals as participants, moving the scheme away from Commonwealth facilitated 
mobility. 
The YMS is currently restricted to eight participating countries, which have a special reciprocal 
agreement with the UK.  These include: Australia, Canada, Japan, Monaco, New Zealand, Hong 
Kong, Republic of Korea and Taiwan. Each of the participating countries is prescribed an annual 
allocation of total YMS visas, based on the relative equivalent YMS visas issued to UK nationals on 
the respective schemes. As was previously the case under the WHM scheme, those with British 
overseas, British overseas territories or British national (overseas) citizenships’ can also apply.  
The list of countries participating in the scheme is thus much smaller than on the original UK WHM 
programme. Moreover, the emphasis of the scheme being to facilitate cultural exchange between 
Commonwealth citizens has largely been abandoned. Having said this, the allocation of YMS visas to 
Old Commonwealth (and therefore predominantly white and English speaking) countries is 
substantially larger than non-Commonwealth countries. For example, since January 2016 the number 
of Tier 5 (Youth Mobility Scheme) visas available increased by 20 per cent for Australians, and 
therefore Australians were allocated 70 per cent of the total YMS visas available in 2016.  
As of February 2019, applicants have a maintenance requirement of £1,890 in savings demonstrated 
through verifiable bank statements. Applicants can apply for an YMS up to three months before they 
travel to the UK with a visa cost of £244 to apply. Applicants must also pay a £300 NHS health 
surcharge. The YMS is a one-shot visa meaning that applicants must not previously have entered or 
spent time in the United Kingdom on a Working Holiday Visa, or a Tier 5 YMS visa. The current 
YMS visa gives 24 months leave to remain and limited working restrictionsxxxvi. Applicants can enter 
the UK at any time while their visa is valid, and leave and come back at any time during their stay 
without needing to reapply for a visa. Applicants can study, be self-employed and set up a company. 
Participants cannot extend their stay, cannot access public funds and cannot bring family with them 
(they must apply separately). 
Previously, participants on the WHM could switch into work permit employment if they secured a job 
before the expiration of their WHM, and at one point WHM could even switch into the now 
terminated Tier 1 general category, where applicants did not need a job offer. However, the last eight 
years have seen stringent changes to switching visas, and current policy stipulates that YMS 
participants must leave the UK before their YMS visa expires. In this respect, the YMS is and always 
has been a strictly temporary mobility, although the previous facilitation to switch to more permanent 
visas in-country previously equally made this a transitory route at one point.  
There are two fundamental differences of the YMS visa in contrast to all other UK visas. Firstly, the 
YMS is age specific, and secondly the visa has no sponsorship requirements. In the case of youth 
mobility schemes, temporal eligibility − referring to the biological age restrictions for these visas 
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(aged 18-30) – confers particular life stages as desirable bio-political characteristics of migrants where 
youth is prizedxxxvii. Young migrants are then constructed ‘as desirable migrants of the neoliberal 
state, representing labour capacity without the ‘social burden’ associated with being elderly or having 
dependent children’xxxviii . In this sense, YMS migrants’ temporality and life stage create lucrative 
labour market characteristics.  
The second crucial difference in the YMS visa in contrast to all other visas in the UK system is that it 
does not require a job offer, employer sponsorship or stringent Tier 2 eligibility requirements. 
Employers can therefore easily hire YMS migrants without bureaucratic processes or the need to 
conduct a resident labour market test to ensure no resident can fill a vacancy. In this sense, the YMS 
visa is the most liberal in the UK immigration system. At the same time, the lack of certification 
criterion means there is a lack of data available regarding the labour market activity of YMS migrants, 
or indeed their distributional spread across the country. I now turn to the interview and survey results 
of current Australian YMS migrants living in London to explore the labour market activity and 
motivations to migrate for this group to reflect on whether an EU wide YMS would be workable.  
Youth Mobility Migrants: Australians in London  
Whilst considerable attention has been paid to on the one hand the global elite (moving for example 
between financial sectors), and on the other hand the movement of individuals from the ‘developing’ 
world to the industrialised world, ‘there has been surprisingly little attention of the “middling” forms 
of transnational migrants, if we understand middling in terms of socio-economic and class position in 
a country of origin’xxxix. There is a strong element of voluntarism that underpins this type of 
migration, and the element of pleasure seeking makes this group quite distinct from the economic 
migration or the political refugee driven by exilexl . 
Whilst YMS or working holidaymakers globally are far from a homogenous group, there are a 
number of characteristics that form the typical profile of a working holidaymaker: young, middle 
class, and often highly educated.  The YMS is often undertaken as a rite of passagexli for the in-
between life stages for example between higher education and professional careers. Between visa 
(including required savings and the NHS surcharge) and travel costs coupled with savings needed to 
safeguard against initial unemployment, undertaking a prolonged overseas experience, especially in 
London, is an expensive endeavour.  
The research consisted of a sample of 75 YMS Australians predominantly living in London. This is a 
non-representative and a small sample but nonetheless with a void of information on YMS migrants 
due to the lack of certification requirements, our results provide a snapshot of the activity of YMS 
Australians residing in London. It is important to note that the labour market activity in other 
towns/cities or other nationalities on YMS may be vastly different yet there is no way of knowing 
where YMS migrants reside in the UK or why they migrate to specific locations
xliii. We conducted a closed survey with
xlii. Participants were 
selected via snowball sampling with the assistance of an expatriate group (Aussies in London) set up 
specifically for young Australians in London  75 migrants at 
various events set up by the group, and twenty of these individuals self-selected for in-depth 
interviews conducted at a later time in various locations across London between April 2016 and May 
2017. The survey sample consisted of 32 male respondents and 43 female respondents, with the 
majority originating from New South Wales (40 per cent), followed by Victoria (25 per cent) and 
Western Australia (13 per cent). Interviews were coded manually using a basic coding framework to 
identify key themes from the interviews including motivations to migrate, integration themes, 
socialisation, and labour market relations.  
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From the outset it needs to be stressed that Australian migrants residing in the UK are somewhat 
unique in comparison to other nationalities due to the deep history of migration and colonial ties 
between nations. The UK has long been the preferred destination for Australians looking to 
permanently emigrate, accounting for 20.9 per cent of Australian emigrants in the period 1996 and 
2006xliv. Migration systems theory suggests that any migration can be seen in terms of the one hand 
macro factors (namely institutional) and micro structures, such as networks, practices and beliefs of 
migrants themselvesxlv . This is certainly pertinent within the mobility under study here. The colonial 
history explains the long established WHM/YMS and acts as the macro institutional structure that 
legitimises this movement. On the other hand, the cultural connections and history that the two 
nations share, including shared language, as well as personal connections such as extended family 
partly explain why the UK is chosen as a destination. As Wilson et al. suggest that the ‘rite de 
passage’ year that many spend in England ‘is one of the last remaining vestiges of the British imperial 
diaspora’xlvi .  
Labour market activity: assumptions and realities  
While temporary migrants have typically being concentrated in low skilled sectors and often face 
prolonged periods of unemploymentxlvii, a striking finding among our respondents
xlviii. The findings demonstrate that 
 was that the 
majority had no difficulties in acquiring a job and were working in high and mid skilled professional 
occupations. The sample was overwhelmingly concentrated in teaching professions, however this may 
be due to a possible sampling bias via snowball sampling. While the majority were working in skilled 
occupations, many were nonetheless working under precarious contracts, suggesting that young 
migrants, like many other young Britons, absorb risks of work through precarious contracts 
underpinned by temporal flexibility YMS Australians have a 
positive and inclusive experience in the UK labour market in stark contrast to many other temporary 
migrants. This stems from presumably employers’ preferences for temporally flexible, ultra-mobile 
workers arguably coupled with proficient English, the aesthetic labour characteristic of youth, and the 
acceptable trade-off of precariousness young Australians accept in return for the flexible working 
arrangements to suit their travel plans.  
While the sample were largely highly skilled – defined as possessing tertiary education − over half did 
not try to get their qualifications recognised in the UK (53 per cent), and of those who did 38 per cent 
had no difficulties getting qualifications recognised. The majority of our respondents used a 
recruitment company before leaving Australia to secure employment before arrival, and 67 per cent 
used a recruitment agency – based in the UK or Australia − to acquire their current job.  
 
The majority of respondents were, unsurprisingly given their temporary status, working on time-
limited work contracts. Sixty four per cent of respondents were working on fixed term contracts, 
seasonal work and agency temping. The majority of those on fixed term contracts were for less than 
12 months, with 40 per cent having contracts lasting less than six months. However, with ambiguity 
on legal definition of zero hour contractsxlix and as revealed in interviews with respondents, many 
were likely working on zero hour contracts without necessarily being aware of it. 
 
YMS Australians were overall content with their precarious contracts; only half of respondents 
wanted a more permanent or secure job in the UK. Fifty five per cent of the sample stated they were 
working in their ideal sector, and 70 per cent were working in either their ideal job or sector. Ninety 
per cent were satisfied with their employer and only five per cent of respondents were unsatisfied with 
their job. Thus, despite the insecure nature of employment, due to the primary motivation to migrate 
for tourism and as a rite of passage, the flexibility inherent in these types of atypical contracts seem to 
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be advantageous for both employer and workers. In this sense, employers utilise the fluid, young, 
mobile characteristics of young Australians. 
 
The young Australians in our sample were both highly skilled with 69 per cent possessing a bachelor 
degree or higher, and the majority were working high skilled professional jobs. Strikingly, 
respondents were overwhelmingly working in the teaching professions (40 per cent), principally as 
substitute teachers. However, this may be due to a sampling bias as we used a snowball sampling 
strategy. Moreover, it is possible that the expatriate group may be overrepresented by those in 
teaching professions due to friendship networks utilising the same service. Eleven per cent were 
working in professional business and administrative roles, and a further nine per cent were working in 
clerical roles, with other respondents working in retail and care. A minority were working in 
elementary occupations. In contrast to other temporary migrants who often face prolonged periods of 
unemploymentl the findings suggest that YMS Australians face far less barriers to employment than 
other migrants do. Young Australians find it easy to acquire employment, with 85 per cent of the 
sample in employment and 73 per cent of respondents having applied for between zero and five jobs 
in total in the UK. 
 
The majority of respondents had no trouble in gaining employment in the UK (66 per cent), zero 
respondents had experienced discrimination, and over half of respondents said that they have never 
been in the position of looking for work in the UK (52 per cent). Of those that had difficulties in 
gaining employment, the two key issues were administrative loop holes with acquiring national 
insurance numbers, and the time-limited YMS visa itself dissuading employers. The latter was 
especially acute for those seeking high skilled jobs in their specific sector; one male interviewee 
spoke of having a job offer in engineering before arriving to the UK but the employer cancelled the 
offer on realising the applicant was on a time-bound visa.  
 
In the knowledge of their two-year visa dissuading some employers, YMS Australians are undeterred 
by precarious contracts because mobility is principally for leisure and therefore their primary 
consideration is short-term financial gain with maximum employment flexibility:  
[My friend] she gets paid peanuts but with 10 months on her visa to go she’d rather stick to 
that as she doesn’t think another employer will pick her up…a lot of employers want to see 
that longer term visas (Female, 25) 
 
While all participants spoke about being motivated to migrate as a rite of passage and/or time to self-
explore before “growing up”, for some – with London’s global reputation  – it also served as a way to 
build their career prospects. Just under a third of the sample cited work experience and improving 
career prospects as their primary motivation to migrate to Britain, and three quarters of respondents 
thought their work experience would aid their career when returning to Australia (76 per cent). 
Broadly, those in the younger cohort (aged 18-24) migrated purely for “play” in contrast to older 
YMS (aged 25-31) Australians who while seeking a rite of passage also migrate to the UK for work 
experience and career progression back in their homeland. This in turn highlights the blurriness of this 
mobility between self-exploration and individualisation and economic calculus:  
Essentially there is more of a competitive market, bigger companies involved so it’s more 
competitive and they attract a range of international talent as well, so I guess it’s competitive 
not just in terms of the actual market but also in terms of human resources as well, in terms of 
other people wanting jobs. So it’s quite multicultural in that aspect so I think working with 
people from different countries – that’s value to bring back to Australia in addition to more of 
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the job specific components and being able to work with, yes, bigger budgets , more difficult 
clients and different scenarios (Male 29) 
 
Motivations to migrate 
Precarious work was an acceptable trade-off for these young migrants for the pull of London in terms 
of global transport to Europe: ‘You just have to work to sustain travel’ (Female 25).  Almost 90 per 
cent of the sample had travelled to destinations in Europe during their stay in Britain, and 65 per cent 
of respondents cited travelling in Europe specifically as their main motivation to migrate. It is 
precisely the integration of long-term leisure travel with employment, which ‘extends both the 
temporal and experiential dimensions of the overseas experience beyond what is commonly 
understood as tourism’li. Yet this mobility is undoubtedly motivated at least in part, if not primarily, 
for tourism in a broad sense.   
 
What was striking amongst respondents, was that the decision to migrate was not about Britain per se, 
but London specifically and crucially the ease of travelling to Europe: In terms of application for 
leaving Perth I was purely invested in London in hearing about those opportunities… I didn't have 
any interest in any other city to be honest (Male 27). This is not unique to young Australians of 
course, nor is there anything unique about London to other global cities. Nonetheless, one of the key 
pulls of London for these young migrants then is its central position in terms of global transport to 
Europe and more generally hubs of communication flows. 
  
The attraction of London is within its internationally connected cultural and social institutions, and its 
cosmopolitan environment. Interviewees spoke about being enlightened by living in London and 
experiencing ‘super diversity’lii, especially from those who grew up in rural towns in Australia: 
People said London is a multicultural city. And you’re like of course it is, it’s one of the 
biggest cities and it’s in Europe. But in my head I didn’t expect it to be this multicultural. In 
my head I’d painted a picture of a normal day in London, and I wouldn’t have imagined so 
many varieties of culture, especially coming from Australia where we are multicultural but 
we’re still pretty damn white. So for example we’d never seen an Orthodox Jew before! It’s 
really broadened our ideas of religion and cultures (Female 28, Male 26) 
YMS Australians had travelled all over Europe, with most having visited at least 10 EU countries in 
the preceding 12 months. Some of these were weekend trips, whilst other trips lasted up to three 
weeks. Whilst almost 88 per cent of our respondents had travelled outside of the UK during their 
YMS stay, very few had travelled within the UK; the majority had never left London. This reinforces 
that, in our sample at least, YMS Australians, are drawn to London and the ease of travel to Europe 
specifically, as opposed to the UK generally. When asked a multiple choice question on why they 
migrated to the UK as opposed to any other destination, 34 per cent cited London offering better 
travel opportunities, 20 per cent said that English being the dominant language made it the ideal 
destination, 16 per cent cited the YMS visa being one of the easiest to acquire and eight per cent 
stated that the UK offered better work experience than other countries. It is possible that London is 
particularly attractive for YMS Australians specifically, yet the overall Australian population in the 
UK is disproportionately resident in London in contrast to the rest of the UK (53 per cent)liii. 
 
Essentially London offers YMS Australians easy travel connections to Europe whilst at the same time 
being an English-speaking nation with similar cultural, political and social institutions to Australia. 
Moreover, the UK generally is a familiar place for YMS Australians with almost half our respondents 
having previously visited the UK (47 per cent). Crucially the UK offers YMS Australians familiar 
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networks due to either extended family or other Australians being resident in the UK, with 79 per cent 
of our sample knowing another Australian living in London before arriving. London offers these 
young migrants − who are usually experiencing migration for the first time − both a level of 
familiarity and excitement.  
Conclusion  
Post Brexit immigration policy is currently ambiguous and may ultimately be determined by any trade 
deals the UK agree with reciprocal countries. Nonetheless, the loss of EU labour is likely to impact on 
particular sectors, especially low (or fundamental) skilled-based sectors. One of the government’s 
concrete proposals is to establish an EU wide YMS on the belief that YMS migrants undertake low 
skilled jobs. With no certification requirements on the YMS visa, there is relatively little known about 
YMS migrants. Drawing on policy analysis alongside survey and interview data from Australian 
YMS migrants, this paper has sought to bridge some of the knowledge gaps as to the labour market 
activity and the motivations to migrate of YMS migrants.  
Our findings suggest that the assumptions surrounding the sectoral and skill distribution of YMS 
migrants is potentially inaccurate. Whilst our sample was small and non-representative, the majority 
of Australian YMS migrants were working in high skilled professions, and were themselves highly 
skilled. This calls into question whether the proposal for an EU wide YMS would necessarily alleviate 
any residual labour shortages in low and mid skilled sectors as a result of ending free movement. 
Whilst it is of course possible that other YMS migrants take up low skilled jobs in other UK regions, 
the abundance of middle or high skilled jobs in London, albeit precarious, provide little incentive for 
YMS migrants to undertake low skilled jobs.  
Key to the success and attractiveness of the YMS visa is that it provides non-EU migrants an 
opportunity to travel Europe more widely. This is evidently the critical reason why Australian YMS 
migrants select the UK as their destination of choice. Given that EU citizens can freely travel, work 
and reside in all Member States, there is little reason to believe that the UK would be attractive for 
young EU citizens in this respect. A further reason YMS Australian migrants choose the UK is that 
English is the dominant language allowing migrants to acquire employment and integrate relatively 
easily. Evidently, this would not be the case for nationalities of the remaining 27 Member States, thus 
reinforcing that an EU wide YMS would not necessarily be attractive to EU citizens. Of course EU 
migrants may wish to improve their English language skills by residing in the UK, but whether this 
alone is significant enough to attract young EU migrants is highly questionable.  London as a global 
super diverse city with its cosmopolitanism and global reputation in many sectors provides a final 
motivation for YMS Australians to reside in the UK. Yet it is possible that Brexit, and the likely 
negative economic impact, may detrimentally effect London’s reputation in this regardliv, which raises 
questions around whether London would remain an attractive destination for young EU migrants.  
Moreover, labour shortages from free movement ending are likely to hit many parts of the UK outside 
of London. Whether young EU migrants would wish to reside outside of London for such a short 
period is debatable. All things considered, it is unlikely that the YMS visa would be as attractive to 
young EU migrants as it is with non-EU migrants. There is simply little to offer which EU migrants 
cannot acquire elsewhere in Europe with no limitations on their residency and opportunities to settle.  
More generally, expanding temporary migration routes runs the risk of increasing exploitation and 
potentially irregular migration. From the employer perspective, especially those in low skilled sectors, 
the training necessary for many jobs dissuades employers from hiring temporary migrants, in the 
knowledge that their workers will need to leave. At the same time, if the government were to propose 
certification requirements for YMS migrants in order to nudge and control migrant workers into 
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specific sectors where shortages were rife, this creates the potential for exploitation (as seen in the 
WHM in Australia see Reilly 2015), and again offers employers little incentive to undergo a heavily 
bureaucratic and often expensive sponsorship process for workers who will leave within a short 
period.  
The policy evolution of the YMS visa reveals how the numerous administrations have remodelled the 
visa from a Commonwealth tourism scheme to a labour market route. If the government were to 
establish this as a EU wide scheme it would need to expand rights in order to make this attractive to 
EU migrants. This could include reinstating previous rights, such as allowing YMS migrants to transit 
to another visa whilst remaining in the UK (such as a Tier 2 visa), and providing a route to 
permanency by allowing the YMS visa time to count towards eligibility for indefinite leave to remain. 
This is especially pertinent given that our findings suggest that YMS migrants are skilled individuals 
and thus more liberal rights attached to this visa could potentially be in line with the government’s 
aims to boost human capital and attract high skilled migrantslv. Evidently, even providing for a more 
attractive visa may not be enough to attract EU migrants to a country that is seen to have a reputation 
for being hostile to immigrants.   
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